Based on panel data covering 114 countries in the world, this study investigates the direct, indirect and total effects of trade flows in environmental goods (EG) on total CO2 and SO2 emissions. Our system-GMM estimations reveal positive direct scale -[between-industry] composition effects prevailing on the negative direct technique -[within-industry] composition effects (if any), as well as compensating the significant indirect technique effects channelled by the stringency of environmental regulations and per capita income. If the net importers of EGs (namely from the APEC54 and WTO26 lists) are recurrently found to face increased pollution (in particular CO2 emissions) due to direct scale-composition effects of trade in EGs, the EGs' net exporters are more likely to see their local pollution to decrease, in particular thanks to income-induced effects. We show that the direct, indirect and total effects of trade in EGs depend on the country's net trade status, the EGs' classification and the pollutant considered. in particular thanks to income-induced effects. We show that the direct, indirect and total effects of trade in EGs depend on the country's net trade status, the EGs' classification and the pollutant considered.
Introduction
Numerous studies have explored the environmental impact of international trade, but their results are still not conclusive. 1 This ambiguity would come from the diverse and opposing macro-level channels and micro-level mechanisms of transmission of the effects of trade on the environmental quality. The macro-level channels, through the scale effect (linking the emission changes to the overall level of economic activity), the composition effect (reflecting changes in pollution due to changes in the composition of the economic activity) and the technique effect (linking the changes in pollution to changes in emission intensities of each industry), have been extensively investigated, both theoretically and empirically. As predicted by the theory, scale effects are found to increase pollution and technique effects to lower emissions. The sign of the composition effects would vary across countries and the time-period explored. When investigating the impact of trade on the environmental quality, the academic literature has generally tended to focus on the relationship between the competitiveness of pollution-intensive industries and the stringency of environmental regulations, with particular attention paid to the Pollution Haven Hypothesis. Following this hypothesis, under free trade, stringent environmental regulations in one country lead to the relocation of pollutionintensive industries in countries with laxer regulations. Therefore, a scale effect on pollution should occur in the country hosting those pollution-intensive industries, which would consequently raise the overall pollution level. If pollution havens may theoretically arise from differences in the environmental carrying capacity, institutional capacity and environmental policy (Brander and Scott Taylor, 1998; Copeland and Taylor, 2003) , their empirical validation is not a simple issue and depends, among other things, on the differences in technology between industrial and developing country investors (Dean, Lovely and Wang, 2009) , the stringency level of the environmental regulations in the host economy (Ben Kheder and Zugravu, 2012) , the abundance of exhaustible resources in the host country (Dam and Scholtens, 2012) , the multinationals' (vertical versus horizontal) motives (Rezza, 2013; Tang, 2015) , the corruption level in the host country and multinationals' pollution intensity (Manderson and Kneller, 2012) and externalities associated with foreign firms' agglomeration (Wagner and Timmins, 2009). 2 A broad conclusion of the literature on the link between trade and environment is that international trade has a weak effect, or no effect, on pollution via the composition effect, and the recent emission reductions across the countries in the world would have resulted from a significant negative (income-induced) technique effect (Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor, 2001; Cole and Elliott, 2003; Grether, Mathys and de Melo, 2009; Levinson, 2009; Managi, Hibiki and Tsurumi, 2009; Brunel and Levinson, 2016) . However, following a recent and constructive literature review by Cherniwchan, Copeland and Taylor (2017) , the standard decomposition at the industry level would miss a reduction in emissions likely to arise from a trade-induced reallocation of output across firms in the same sector but with different emission intensities (from dirty to clean firms). That would underestimate the effects 6 Third, trade liberalization in EGs, making cleaner technologies more widely available, especially in developing countries, must be good for the environment. Market expansion resulting from trade liberalization should put pressure on local prices by increasing competition between imported and domestic goods. Lower compliance costs should finally facilitate setting (and reaching) stringent GHG emission targets. The literature investigating the link between trade in EGs and environmental performance is mainly theoretical and has been focusing on the environmental policy design in the context of EGs' trade liberalization (Feess and Muehlheusser, 2002; Copeland, 2005; Canton, Soubeyran and Stahn, 2008; Greaker and Rosendahl, 2008; David, Nimubona and Sinclair-Desgagné, 2011; Nimubona, 2012; Sauvage, 2014) . For instance, Feess and Muehlheusser (2002) show that, when the domestic eco-firms are likely to benefit from higher emission tax rates, the home government would set stricter environmental regulations than foreign governments, which would lead to national leadership in pollution control. 5 Stricter environmental regulations would induce more firms to pay the initial R&D cost to enter the eco-industry, which should lead to an increased export market share of the domestic eco-industry. An empirical illustration of these last effects is proposed by Costantini and Mazzanti (2010) . By employing a gravity model of trade, the authors find that environmental and energy taxes in the EU-15 countries between 1996 and 2007 have been associated with higher EGs exports. Although stringent environmental regulations lead to more environmental R&D by domestic firms in a small open economy, Greaker (2006) suggests that foreign eco-firms would also increase their R&D spending and sales of EGs to this country. Similarly, Greaker and Rosendahl (2008) show that stricter environmental policy is good for the domestic polluting industry, allowing it to get abatement equipment easier and at lower costs. Nonetheless, the authors suggest that this increase in demand for EGs from the domestic polluting industry may benefit foreign eco-firms at the expense of the domestic eco-industry. Hence, an especially stringent environmental policy should not be a suitable industrial policy for small open economies wishing to develop new successful export-oriented sectors. Moreover, while increased emission tax rates should induce new abatement suppliers to enter the market, David, Nimubona and Sinclair-Desgagné (2011) show it might not increase abatement efforts, because the demand for the abatement goods becomes more price inelastic when taxes are severe, thus leading the eco-firms to reduce their output.
An interesting research question emerging from the above-discussed literature is the interaction between the environmental policy and the EGs' tariffs in countries that are not exporters or even not producers of such goods.
For instance, Nimubona (2012) develops a theoretical framework to investigate the EGs' trade liberalization effects in a developing country that is a non-competitive producer of abatement technologies and, thus, it is dependent on EGs imports. The author suggests that, when weak tariffs on EGs cannot sufficiently extract rents generated by severe environmental policy for an imperfectly competitive eco-industry, the government might choose to reduce the stringency of pollution taxes to maximize domestic social welfare. This can finally result in increased domestic pollution levels. Hence, following Nimubona (2012) , exogenous reductions of EGs tariffs in the developing 7 countries would lead their governments -which are facing a loss of rents extracted from foreign eco-firms -to lower emission taxes. In conclusion, recent theoretical studies (Perino, 2010; David, Nimubona and SinclairDesgagné, 2011; Nimubona, 2012; Bréchet and Ly, 2013; Dijkstra and Mathew, 2016 ) find comparable results from quite different models; that is, despite increasing the expected cleanliness of production, EGs' trade liberalization may finally increase overall pollution. More precisely, the increased availability of cleaner technology due to trade liberalization would cause a 'backfire effect' 6 and the improved welfare would come at the expense of the environment. Total pollution should increase because more production is allowed by the government enjoying the opportunity for cleaner production. To avoid such negative outcomes, Nimubona (2012) suggests using quantitative abatement standards as an alternative pollution policy instrument accompanying the EGs' trade liberalization.
Given these contrasting results of the recent academic research on the expected effects of EGs trade liberalization, we can cast doubt on the 'triple win' scenario presumed by international organizations (in particular, the OECD and WTO). Although a 'double win' for welfare and trade has received quite reliable empirical proofs, the last and certainly not the least important and desired 'win' -in terms of environmental performance -is still the subject of debate. To bring further insights to this issue, it becomes important to ask the following questions: How does EGs trade ultimately affect the environmental quality? Are the non-competitive producers (or net importers) affected in the same way as the leading exporters of EGs? These questions form the research objective of our empirical study, which aims to estimate the effect of EGs trade on pollution in countries with different trade profiles. Whereas the above reviewed theoretical studies allow understanding the micro-level mechanisms at work, their empirical check is still a difficult task because of poor or virtually inexistent (crosscountry) firm-level data on EGs imports and exports. Nevertheless, empirical data are available for the investigation of the macro-level channels through which EGs trade would affect the environment. However, we should be careful with their interpretations, which might be mis-specified when the micro-level mechanisms are omitted from the analysis (see Cherniwchan, Copeland and Taylor, 2017) .
In spite of a series of reports by international organizations (OECD, 2001 (OECD, , 2005 WTO, 2001; UNCTAD, 2003; Bora and Teh, 2004; World Bank, 2007) , the academic literature includes very few empirical studies on the potential effects of EGs' trade on environmental quality (e.g., Wooders, 2009; de Alwis, 2015; Zugravu-Soilita, 2016 (ii) a total positive effect on water pollution (BOD emissions) because of the prevailing, direct scale-composition effect; and (iii) no significant total effect on SO2 emissions. Results are further diverging for specific pollutants and EGs categories (e.g., end-of-pipe, integrated solutions, environmentally preferable products). For instance, trade intensity in end-of-pipe abatement technologies would reduce only SO2 emissions through a direct technique effect.
However, we should mention that these empirical results, specific to the transition economies during a particular time period in the early 2000s (when these countries opened their economies considerably), may not give generalized conclusions for all countries in the world, and an empirical investigation including all the economies for which data are available would be of high academic value and policy implications. Moreover, as suggested by the theoretical literature linking EGs trade to the stringency of the environmental policy, particular attention must be paid to the countries that are not [or just non-performing] producers of EGs.
Consequently, the originality of our study is twofold. First, we perform a comparative empirical study on the EGs' trade impact on pollution in a large set of highly heterogeneous countries by exploring distinctions between 'EGs' net importer' and 'EGs' net exporter' trade status. Second, the empirical strategy employed allows us to estimate the macro-level channels (direct and indirect effects, via income and environmental policy) through which the trade of EGs affects pollution. More precisely, this study seeks to investigate the impacts of EGs' trade on total CO2 and SO2 emissions in 114 countries (70-75% of data points corresponding to situations of 'net importer' and 25-30% -'net exporter') between 1996 and 2011 7 , by using instrumental variable regressions and system-GMM estimations that simultaneously explain the pollution, the stringency of environmental regulations and the per-capita income.
This paper is structured as follows. After the introduction of our research objectives and the literature review in section 1, section 2 depicts some stylized facts on trade in EGs. Section 3 presents the theoretical background of our empirical model, and the estimation strategy and data are specified in section 4. The empirical results are discussed in section 5. The last section presents conclusions and some policy implications, and identifies directions for further research.
9 equipment used in environmental activities, such as pollution control and waste management) has reached a broad support. The lists compiled by OECD and the 21 member economies of Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC) in the late 1990s have been the references so far (see Steenblik, 2005) . Another criterion would be the identification of products that cause less damage to the environment during one of their life-cycle stages because of the manner they are manufactured, collected, used, destroyed or recovered, i.e. the so-called 'environmentally preferable products (EPPs)'. Nevertheless, the identification of EPPs generally relies on labelling and certification measures, and because EPPs differentiate among 'like products', the WTO has not yet considered to engage negotiation on these products. A performance criterion (e.g. energy efficiency during product use) was also
proposed, but could be difficult to apply in a dynamic perspective because of the reality of technological progress and innovation.
The lack of an international agreement is mainly due to the practical difficulties in defining EGs (Steenblik, 2005 (Steenblik, , 2007 Balineau and de Melo, 2013) . First, the inadequacy of the Harmonized System's (HS) descriptors at the sixdigit level does not allow the designation of specific goods that are really deemed climate-friendly. Indeed, the more digits there are in a classification code, the more specific the description of the corresponding product. However, the HS codes are harmonized only up to the six-digit level. As highlighted by Zhang (2011) , HS categories at the six-digit level include products that may have both environmental and non-environmental uses. The author brings the example of windmill pump, which despite of being a single-use product is identified as part of HS 841381, which also includes other pumps. Second, the identification difficulty of EGs concerns the 'double-use' problem,
i.e. the existence of products with multiple uses, some of which are not environmental. For example, the gas turbines of HS 841182 may be used for electricity generation from biogas, which is rather climate-friendly, but they may also have other non-environmental applications (e.g., as aircraft turbines). In fact, they are very few HS codes at the six-digit level that perfectly match single-use EGs (e.g., HS 841011/2 for hydraulic turbines, HS 850231 for wind-powered electric generating sets). As stated by Zhang (2011) , liberalizing dual-use products may have adverse effects on most of the developing countries. In particular, a broad liberalization of products may weaken their established domestic industries and sharply reduce their tariff revenues, which still represent an important share in government revenues. In addition, the problem of goods defined in terms of their relative environmental performance in use may require moving the targets as technology improves over time. For instance, whereas natural gas is less carbon emitting than coal, it is more polluting than wind power and even more polluting than a coalfired power plant coupled with carbon capture and storage technology. There also might be serious doubts about the use of some products (e.g., bio-fuels) to save energy for example (Steenblik, 2007; Hufbauer, Charnovitz and Kim, 2009 for environmental-protection (principally air pollution control, management of solid and hazardous waste, as well as water treatment and waste-water management), and 1 sub-heading for environmentally preferable products (bamboo).
However, it should be noted that only 12 of the codes on the APEC list are sufficiently precise to ensure that liberalization will only pertain to EGs; in contrast, 9 codes include products that have broad (non-environmental)
applications (e.g., used in the petroleum, nuclear, mining and automobile industries).
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Figure 1 Distribution of EGs exports and imports

Theoretical framework and empirical strategy
Theoretical framework and empirical model
Following the conventional function used in the environmental economics literature to investigate changes in 13 Following the World Bank's classification, based on income per habitant.
pollution (e.g. Grossman and Krueger, 1993; Copeland and Taylor, 1994, 2005; Levinson, 2009; Managi, 2011) , we can write total emissions E as the sum of emissions from each of activity/sector, ei, which may be further written as the total output, Y -i.e., the scale effect -, multiplied by each sector's share in this output, ( = ) ⁄ -i.e. the composition effect-, and the emission per unit of y produced (the sector's emission intensity), -i.e. the technique effect.
In vector notation, we have:
where E and Y are scalars representing the total emissions and economic output (i.e., GDP), respectively; τ and γ are × 1 vectors.
At the same time, as suggested by Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001) , firms have access to abatement technology (i.e., improved environmental technologies and/or efficient management), which is generally costly. By assuming that pollution is directly proportional to output, and that pollution abatement is a constant return to scale activity, a sector's emission may be written:
where is the productivity of environmental technologies and is the pollution abatement effort. With constant environmental technologies, pollution abatement efforts increase and emissions decline when the price of pollution abatement technologies decreases.
Taking the natural log of equation (2)(4) and combining it with equation (3) yields:
All else constant (e.g., mix of activities/sectors, environmental techniques and pollution abatement effort), the first term measures the increase in emissions when scaling up economic activity (GDP). Keeping constant output, environmental technologies and abatement efforts by the economic sector, the second term reflects the (betweenindustry) composition effect; that is, emissions increase if more resources are devoted to polluting sectors. A common proxy for this composition effect is the capital-to-labour ration (K/L). Theoretically, if a country is more capital abundant, it has a comparative advantage in capital-intensive activities, which are also empirically found to be more pollution intensive (see Mani and Wheeler, 1998; Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor, 2001; Cole and Elliott, 2003, 2005; Managi, Hibiki and Tsurumi, 2009 ).
The last two terms represent the technique (including within-industry reorganization) effects. Following ZugravuSoilita (2017), we distinguish between 'autonomous' and 'exogenous' technique effects. Changes in production methods may affect pollution intensity through two ways:
14  First, 'exogenous' or 'induced' technique effects appear when technological change and abatement efforts occur in response to regulatory mandates. These effects may be captured by a variable measuring the stringency of environmental regulations (ER). 14 Although stringent environmental regulations are not always associated to cleaner technologies, in particular when not efficiently implemented and/or enforced, numerous empirical investigations (e.g., Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Arimura, Hibiki and Johnstone, 2007; Cao and Prakash, 2012) show that stringent, well-designed environmental policy is -all else equalassociated with an increased investment in environmental R&D accelerating environmental innovation and thus lowering pollution intensities. Following the strategy of Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001) , GDP and GNI/cap enter our pollution equation simultaneously in order to distinguish between the scale of the economy (GDP -measuring the intensity of the economic activity) and income (GNI/cap -capturing the richness of a country's inhabitants and economic agents, and more specifically, their willingness-to-pay for environmental goods).
With regard to Trade_EGs, provided trade in EGs does not affect either the economic structure or the production levels, it is assumed to have a negative (technique) effect on pollution by increasing the availability of less expensive and/or more performing EGs 16 . Otherwise, a 'rebound' or even a 'backfire' effect may occur: i.e. despite the marginal abatement cost reduction, one may be encouraged to produce more by maintaining the same total initial level of abatement effort when environmental regulations do not evolve. The sign of Trade_EGs variable should indicate the dominant direct effect on pollution: the 'autonomous' technique (if negative) or scale-composition (if positive). We should however stress that a negative coefficient could also capture effects from within-industry reorganizations in favour of less polluting firms (i.e., within-industry composition effect) due to increased availability of less costly EGs, without necessarily introducing new/more efficient techniques (see Cherniwchan, Copeland and Taylor, 2017) . As this specific effect may not be captured by our K/L variable, which is a proxy for the macro-channel and
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does not reflect micro-mechanisms, we qualify any prevailing negative effect in our empirical estimations based on macro-data as 'a technique-rationalization effect'.
Finally, it is highly stressed that trade openness (Open) is a key variable in explaining the changes in pollution through the scale, composition and technique effects (see Lucas et al., 1992; Dean, 2002; Harbaugh, Levinson and Wilson, 2002; Copeland and Taylor, 2004; Frankel and Rose, 2005) . A country's overall trade openness can have a direct impact on pollution by (i) increasing economic growth through tariff reduction; (ii) shifting production from pollution-intensive to more ecological goods, or vice-versa; and (iii) promoting the diffusion and the use of technological innovations.
In conclusion, following the theoretical and empirical literature on pollution demand and supply, we can derive a reduced-form equation that links pollution emissions to a set of economic factors of which trade in EGs:
We expect positive coefficients for the scale and (between-industry) composition effects; that is, GDP and K/L, and negative coefficients for ER and GNI/cap variables, capturing the technique effects. The coefficients of our trade variables Open and Trade_EGs should reflect the prevailing direct impact on emissions of the country's trade openness ([total exports + total imports]/GDP) and its trade (export + import) in EGs, respectively 17 : if positive -a scale-composition effect and if negative -a technique-rationalization effect.
Introducing in this equation interaction terms between our variable of interest Trade_EGs and a dummy ( _ ) taking value 1 if the country is a 'net importer' of the specified EGs and 0 otherwise, should allow us to explore the specific effects of trade in EGs in countries that are weak performers. In fact, we qualify as 'net importer' a country in a specific year when its EGs imports are superior to EGs exports. It should be noted that this dummy could rather illustrate situations of a 'non-performing' country in the EGs sector, because it also integrates observations of zero trade in EGs 18 .
Finally, indirect effects shall be estimated by endogenizing ER and GNI/cap variables (the possible transmission channels, in particular through technique effects), in a system of simultaneous equations (see next sub-section for our empirical strategy). 17 To better capture the effects of EGs' trade liberalization, one would prefer using EGs' trade openness (or intensity); that is, (EGs exports + EGs imports)/GDP (let's call it Trade_EGs/GDP). Because Trade_EGs/GDP appears to be highly correlated with our variable Open (see Figure B .1 in appendix B), we chose a Trade_EGs variable that should be less likely to suffer from possible collinearity with respect to overall trade openness. Moreover, as tariffs are currently amply low to have significant economic impacts and their further cuts should mainly affect volumes of trade, countries would be ultimately interested to understand the economic and environmental impacts of (increased) trade flows and competitiveness. 18 In our dataset, Trade_EGs has a few zeros. Following a commonly used technique, we added 1 to each observation before taking logs. technique effect on pollution through two channels: (i) a direct effect through consumers' behaviour/producers' investment decisions based on the willingness to pay for the environment; and (ii) an indirect effect by enforcing environmental policy. Therefore, the removal of tariff barriers in a net EGs importing country could lead to a loss of income and a lower demand for environmental quality. At the same time, the increased availability of EGs through tariffs that are cut should increase demand for such goods; this should decrease compliance costs and induce the local government to set more ambitious environmental standards (Nimubona, 2012) . Similarly, as the demand for EGs essentially is being determined by the stringency of environmental regulations, enforced environmental policy is expected to drive international trade in EGs (Sauvage, 2014) . Finally, trade in EGs and environmental regulations normally evolve in response to the emission levels; that is, the higher the pollution emissions and the greater their damage, the more the government (and citizen) would be willing to put pressure on compliance, thus inducing more abatement and increased trade in EGs.
Data and empirical strategy
To deal with this endogeneity problem, we first perform a set of GMM estimations based on instrumental variables (IV-GMM), with robust standard errors (see Table C Table C .1 in Appendix C). These results are quite robust to the inclusion of a time trend and for alternative estimation techniques (see models (4)-(6) in Table C .1 and model 1 in Table C .2, Appendix C). In addition to including lagged variables as valid instruments, we also use Corrup (corruption), 23 which should affect emissions only indirectly through its impact on ER, and eventually on GNI/cap and Trade_EGs, but never with direct effects. Indeed, Corrup has no significant effect when entering directly in the emissions equation (model (2) in Table C .2, Appendix C), but appears to affect pollution indirectly through its impact on ER (model (3) in Table   C .2, Appendix C). With this additional instrument, our model becomes overidentified (otherwise, exactly identified) and the Sargan-Hansen test (Chi2(1) with Prob>Chi2=0.3565) does not allow us to reject the joint null hypothesis:
i.e. our instruments are valid instruments because they are uncorrelated with the error term, and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Finally, following the Montiel-Pflueger robust weak instrument test, the null is rejected at the 5% level and we conclude that our instruments are strong in the sense that the bias is no more than 5% of the worst-case bias (established in a worst-case scenario of completely weak instruments).
Our IV-GMM estimates are both robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and intra-cluster (country) correlation.
Actually, in a panel dataset, we may want to allow observations belonging to each country and coming from a 23 See Table B .1 in appendix B for variables' definitions and sources.
particular time-period to be arbitrarily correlated. We chose to apply (one-way) clustering by unit (i.e. country) to control for country-specific effects and include a time trend variable to capture the time-fixed effects of other omitted variables.
OLS, GLS and IV-GMM regressions give significant and quite robust results concerning the impact of trade in EGs: i.e. all else equal, Trade_EGs increases CO2 emissions. However, these regressions only inform us about the direct effects. Therefore, we further specify and estimate simultaneous equations using the system-GMM technique that, in addition to controlling for endogeneity, should allow us to identify the indirect effects on pollution of trade in EGs (i.e., through ER and GNI/cap). The reduced-form equations are derived from the literature. In particular, the stringency of environmental regulations is found to be significantly influenced, among others, by the environmental quality (current emission levels), income, trade and corruption. 24 With regard to the income reduced-form equation, we retain long-term determinants from the endogenous growth literature; that is, production factors' (labour, physical capital) endowment, trade, geography, and institutions. 25 The following section discusses -in detail -our empirical results from system-GMM estimations.
Empirical results
Impact of trade in EGs from the APEC54 list
Our results from the system-GMM regressions are displayed in Appendix D (see Tables D .1 -D.6). As predicted by the theory, we find support for the scale, composition and technique effects in the pollution regressions; that is, all else equal, whereas any raise in total economic output (GDP) and capital-to-labour ratio increases CO2 and SO2
emissions, income and stringency of the environmental regulations are found to reduce pollution. We also find a significant negative time trend highlighting worldwide technological advances and successful global action to control emissions. Regarding the ER-channel equation, as expected, pollution and willingness to pay for the environment (proxied by per capita income) are found to increase environmental regulations' stringency, whereas corruption appears to induce laxer regulations. At the same time, higher institutional quality and capital abundance exert a positive effect on per capita income (GNI/cap-channel equation). All else equal, trade openness is found to increase pollution in our pooled country sample, mainly through an indirect effect channelled by per capita income. This result is consistent with the body of empirical studies having found that trade openness is increasing income inequality in an overall sample of heterogeneous countries, and may even decrease the average income in the developing countries that are unable to take advantage of knowledge accumulation and technology spillovers. 26
24 See for instance Damania, Fredriksson and List (2003) , Fredriksson et al. (2005) , Greaker and Rosendahl (2006), Zugravu-Soilita, Millock and Duchene (2008) .
25 See Frankel and Romer (1999) , Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) , Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) , Easterly and Levine (2003) , Sachs (2003) , Hibbs and Olsson (2004) , Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) . 26 See for example Kanbur (2015) and Sakyi, Villaverde and Maza (2015) for recent literature reviews. As shown by Kali, Méndez and Reyes (2007) , in addition to volume of trade, the structure of international trade has higher implications for development.
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All the above-mentioned findings are highly robust in our different model specifications, explaining CO2 and SO2 total emissions.
We now focus on the effects of our variable of interest, that is, Trade_EGs. For a broader analysis, we consider in this study two types of indirect effects: (i) exclusive indirect effects, as more restrictive concept including only those influences mediated by the channel variable(s); and (ii) incremental indirect effects, as a wider concept including all compound paths subsequent to our endogenous variables of interest (or channel variables). 27 We present below direct, computed indirect and total effects of trade in EGs on pollution (CO2 and SO2 emission) for the pooled country sample, and by making a distinction between EGs' net importers and EGs' net exporters. Detailed estimation results are available in Appendix D.
As shown in Table 1 , the prevailing direct effect of trade in EGs (from APEC54 list) on pollution is positive-a scale-composition effect-, but not negative-a technique effect-, as expected. This result might validate the assumption of backfire effects and/or support the 'multiple use' fears with respect to trade in EGs, especially in countries with laxer environmental regulations that are generally low performers in EGs. Indeed, we find a statistically highly significant, positive, direct effect only for net importers of EGs (APEC54 list). 
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non-linear combinations of parameter estimates are computed using the nlcom command in Stata. Calculations are based on the 'delta method', an approximation appropriate in large samples.
If trade in EGs appears to have no direct technique effect on pollution in our sample, it is found to reduce emissions through indirect technique effects, mediated by the stringency of environmental regulations (ER) and per capita income (GNI/cap). Naturally, incremental indirect effects are found to be significantly larger than the exclusive indirect effects, with the former still not high enough to compensate the direct harmful effects. This is particularly true for the net importers of EGs, where the total (direct plus indirect) effects on CO2 and SO2 emissions remain positive with exclusive indirect effects, and at best become non-significant when incremental indirect effects are considered. With regard to net exporters, trade in EGs is found to have no statistically significant total effect on CO2
emissions, and to reduce SO2 emissions only when indirect incremental effects mediated by income are included.
Our empirical results support the theoretical predictions by Greaker (2006) and Greaker and Rosendahl (2008) according to which environmental regulations that are too strict might not be the most suitable industrial policy for the countries with performing/emerging export-oriented eco-industrial firms. In fact, trade in EGs is found to have indirect marginal effects on CO2 emissions, mediated by ER, which is significantly higher for net importers than for net exporters. Moreover, these indirect effects are found to be non-significant in the models explaining SO2 emissions for net exporters, where the unique indirect technique effect is mediated by GNI/cap. Hence, governments in the EGs' net exporting countries might be reluctant to increase standards/taxes in order not to increase exposure of the export-oriented eco-sectors to foreign competition. Conversely, the EGs' net importing countries, which are non-(or weak) performers in this sector, would be more likely to increase the stringency of the environmental regulations in order to further enhance availability of EGs at more competing prices. Finally, the indirect effects of trade in EGs, mediated by per capita income, are higher for net exporters compared to net importers, with the former's ecofirms enjoying new/larger markets whereas the latter's ones -if present -might see their domestic markets narrowing.
Alternative classifications of EGs
In this subsection, we perform system-GMM estimations and marginal effects' calculations for trade in EGs listed by WTO (as alternative classifications for the APEC54 list). Indeed, with the classification of EGs being a continuous process -depending on technological progress and current negotiations -the estimations for different categories of EGs should check the robustness of our basic empirical results and allow the generalization of our conclusions.
When focusing on the narrow WTO list of 26 EGs (Table 2 below, with the estimation results in Tables D.3 and D.4 in appendix D), we find similar results compared to trade in EGs from the APEC54 list, with one important difference regarding net exporters; that is, the total effect of trade in EGs, including incremental indirect effects, on CO2 emissions is now significant and negative (like the total effect on SO2 emissions). Therefore, whereas trade in EGs from narrow lists (APEC54 and WTO26) is likely to benefit the environment in the net exporting countries due to gains in income, it is found to increase CO2 and SO2 emissions in the EGs net importing countries where the harmful direct scale-composition effects are not offset by the (still weak) indirect technique effects.
With regard to the WTO's broader list of EGs (WTO408), the results are quite similar to those found for the APEC54 list of EGs when exploring CO2 emissions. That is, trade in EGs has a direct harmful effect on pollution in both the net importing and the net exporting countries, which is completely compensated by the indirect technique effects in the net exporting countries, but the total effects remain positive (at best non-significant with the incremental indirect effects included) in the net importing countries. Interesting results are found for the SO2 emissions, on which trade in EGs from WTO408 list has no significant direct effect for both net importers and net exporters. Given the nature of emission sources for different pollutants, we could suppose that the direct harmful effect on CO2 emissions (when compared to SO2 emissions) is at least partly driven by the international transportation of EGs (in addition to 'multiple use' and possible 'backfire effects'). In addition, while only ER in the net importing countries channels the indirect technique effect of trade in EGs from the APEC54 list, trade in EGs from the WTO408 list reduced SO2 emissions merely through its indirect effect on GNI/cap. As a result, the total effect of trade in EGs (WTO408) on SO2 emissions is negative for both net importers and net exporters. Therefore, we can see that income is an essential channel for reducing emissions through trade in EGs, and its impact is significantly higher when considering the broad list of EGs from WTO (WTO408), for both net importers and net exporters. on both CO2 and SO2 emissions, in both net importing and net exporting countries; however, the result is significant only at the 10% level for net importers. As stated in section 2, 'renewable energy' EGs are the few range of goods identified by a 'unique HS code' and, thus, are more likely to be 'single-use' products. Hence, trade in these EGs, which are designed and used to reduce emissions from one of the most polluting sources (energy sector), reduces CO2 and SO2 emissions by increasing the availability of these products in the net importing countries and by improving the performance of this eco-sector in the net exporting countries. The higher and most significant marginal impacts are naturally found for the latter. Trade in EGs from the 'environmental technologies' category is also found to reduce pollution due to a direct technique effect, but only for net importers and SO2 emissions. Trade in these EGs appears to increase CO2 emissions in both net importing and net exporting countries, and has no statistically significant effect on SO2 emissions in the net exporting countries. One explanation to this result is that 'environmental technologies' are usually more efficient in abating SO2 emissions (some techniques achieving SO2 removal of more than 90%) 28 compared to CO2 emissions, the carbon capture (and storage) being an innovative and still the most expensive technology. Finally, we do not find support for liberalizing trade in EGs from the 'waste management and water treatment' category because of the harmful (direct and total) effects on CO2 and SO2 emissions found for both net importers and net exporters. With regard to the 'air pollution control' category, we cannot formulate specific recommendations because no significant direct and total effects were found in our empirical estimations.
The last result is somehow surprising as we investigate air pollution, and that would be the right EGs category to have a direct technique effect on CO2 and SO2 emissions. In passing, we mention that trade in EGs from the 'air pollution control' category have indirect technique effects passing by ER and GNI/cap, but these results are at best statistically significant at the 5% level.
28 Source: EEA (2008) 
Conclusions
OLS, GLS and IV-GMM regressions of total CO2 emissions of 114 countries on their trade in EGs between 1996
and 2011 suggest that, all else equal, trade in EGs has a positive (harmful) direct effect on pollution. However, these findings do not allow an explanation of the forces at work. To explore the possible transmission channelsin particular through technique effects -we perform system-GMM estimations by simultaneously regressing CO2
(and sequentially SO2) stringency of environmental regulations and per capita income on trade in EGs. Focusing on the trade in EGs from the APEC54 list, our results suggest a positive direct effect on pollution qualified as a scale -[between-industry] composition effect, which supports the general fears concerning 'backfire effects' and/or 'multiple use' of EGs. Because such effects are mostly specific to countries with lax environmental regulations and who are generally low performers in EGs, we also explored marginal effects by net trade status. As expected, we found a statistically highly significant and positive direct effect only for the net importers of EGs. With regard to EGs' trade effects channelled by environmental policy and income, our results find strong evidence of indirect technique effects by highlighting some interesting particularities for countries with different trade status: that is, the indirect technique effects are mostly channelled by income in the EGs' net exporting countries and primarily pass through the stringency of the environmental regulations in the EGs' net importing countries. Hence, our empirical results validate scale, composition and technique effects of trade in EGs on CO2 and SO2 emissions. However, the negative, indirect technique effects do not compensate the positive, direct scale-composition effects in the EGs' net importing countries, with the total effect on pollution being harmful. At best, the total effect on pollution might be non-significant regardless of the net trade status, and even negative on SO2 emissions for the EGs net exporters, when incremental indirect effects (including all compound paths subsequent to channel variables) are considered instead of exclusive indirect effects (including only the influence mediated by the channel variables). If liberalization of trade in
EGs from the APEC54 list, by increasing trade flows, should bring economic benefits, it would increase CO2 and SO2 emissions in these EGs' net importing countries without significantly affecting pollution in the net exporting countries. Thus, the environmental gains from trade in EGs from the APEC54 did not find strong empirical support from our estimations.
For robustness checks, we performed comparative estimations on trade in EGs from the WTO26 list, also a narrow classification like the APEC54 list (but even stricter, because it was reduced to 26 goods). A stricter list should better designate EGs thus avoiding 'multiple use' problems. Our previous results are quite robust, with a single distinction regarding EGs' net exporters: when broader investigating indirect effects (i.e., incremental effects), the total effect is negative on both CO2 and SO2 emissions (but this result is significant at the 5% level). However, we still did not find direct technique (negative) effects, as expected.
Trade in EGs from narrow lists seems to be safer for net exporters. Our stylized facts have shown that these are essentially developed and leading emerging countries. Because the developing countries still lack the purchasing power and technical skills necessary for creation and consolidation of such EGs (APEC54/WTO26) markets, it becomes interesting to investigate broader classifications, like the WTO408 list for which many developing countries enjoy comparative advantages. Unsurprisingly, because of broadly designated goods ('multiple use' problems) and negative externalities from their transportation, traded EGs from WTO408 list exert a direct harmful scale-composition effect on CO2 emissions, regardless of countries' net trade status, which is completely offset by indirect technique effects only in the EGs' net exporting countries. However, an interesting result is that their total impact on SO2 emissions is negative (with incremental indirect effects) for both net exporters and net importers.
This finding is due to indirect technique effects (mainly through income) and no statistically significant direct scalecomposition effects. We suppose the absence of significant direct effects to be explained by opposing forces at work of likely similar magnitudes; that is, negative direct technique -(within-industry) composition (rationalization) effect and positive direct scale -(between-industry) composition effect, which may not be distinguished for EGs' lists of heterogeneous products.
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Consequently, we finish our empirical investigation by performing regressions for distinct, homogenous categories of EGs in the WTO408 list. EGs from 'Waste Management and Water Treatment' and 'Air Pollution Control' categories are found to increase pollution mainly through a direct scale-composition effect, or at best to not affect it significantly (depending on the pollutant and category considered). In contrast, our results found direct and total negative effects on CO2 and SO2 emissions for trade in EGs classified as 'Renewable energy products/technologies', for both net exporters and net importers. Indeed, this category is among the few classifications allowing the designation of single-use EGs. Finally, trade in EGs from the 'Environmental Technologies' category is found to increase CO2 emissions in all the countries through a dominating direct, scalecomposition effect, regardless of their net trade status, and to reduce SO2 emissions only in the net importing countries (with a non-significant effect for net exporters). This last result confirms the higher efficiency of environmental technologies in directly abating SO2 emissions.
As policy implications, our results support boosting trade in carefully defined EGs in terms of their end-use or purpose in order to avoid/reduce the direct harmful scale-composition effects on pollution that are found to prevail on the technique effects in the case of multiple-use products. Because the EGs' net exporters were found to enjoy both economic and environmental (in terms of local pollutant emissions) gains more recurrently than the EGs' net importers, EGs' trade enhancement should be facilitated, in addition to tariff reductions, by EGs' market creation and (institutional and technical) capacity building in developing countries.
Finally, income appears to be an essential channel for reducing emissions through trade in EGs, for both net importers and net exporters (the latter still benefiting the most). Consequently, further research should better explore this channel to understand the mechanisms for different net trade status: e.g. tariff revenues (in that case, the trade liberalization of EGs could worsen environmental quality through income losses);
within-industry reorganization in favour of the most efficient firms due to increased availability of EGs;
increased revenues from high value-added eco-activities, etc. Constructing firm or sector level data to investigate micro-level mechanisms should be the next preoccupation in this direction. 
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